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MEETING THE STATUTE OR BEATING IT: USING 'JOHN DOE"
INDICTMENTS BASED ON DNA TO MEET THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
MEREDITH A. BIEBERt
What can a prosecutor do when the only lead on a rape that oc-
curred nearly six years ago is genetic material and the statute of limi-
tations is about to run? A new option may be to file a 'John Doe" in-
dictment or arrest warrant that identifies the suspect by his genetic
profile in order to commence the prosecution and thus avoid the
running of the statute. Across the country, prosecutors are using this
tactic to preserve rape cases that remain unsolved but threaten to be
lost to the statute of limitations.' Once the government formally
2
commences a prosecution, the statute is tolled and the police can,
theoretically, continue their efforts to identify the suspect. After the
police discover a match for the DNA profile contained in the com-
plaint or indictment, the state can arrest the suspect and put him on
trial in order to determine his guilt or innocence.
Absent the commencement of prosecution, a case cannot be ad-
judicated once the statute of limitations has run. If a suspect is identi-
fied one day beyond the statutory limit, he cannot be tried for the of-
fense. However, in committing certain crimes, such as rape, an
offender often leaves behind some biological material (semen, blood,
t B.A. 1994, George Washington University; J.D. Candidate 2002, University of
Pennsylvania. I would like to thank my family, Arlene Fisk, Charles Gallagher, Johnny
Griffin, III, Stephen Morse, and David Rudovsky.
I DNA indictments have been used in New York, Pennsylvania, California, Florida,
and Wisconsin, among other states. See, e.g., DNA Sample Used to Indict 'John Doe" in
N.Y. Rape Cases, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 16, 2000, at A8 (reporting the DNA indictment of
the so-called "East Side rapist"); Serial Rapist Indicted on Long Island Based Solely on DNA
Evidence, AP, Aug. 9, 2000, LEXIS (describing a seventeen-count indictment of an uni-
dentified rapist linked by DNA evidence to six rapes committed on Long Island be-
tween 1992 and 1995); Jeff Jones, Indictment LDs Suspect by His DNA, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Apr. 20, 2000, at Al (describing the first such indictment used in New Mexico).
2 Do not confuse the use of a genetic code to commence a prosecution with trial
in absentia, where the court actually hears and decides the case without the defendant
being present. The commencement of a prosecution simply takes the case out of the
statute of limitations and preserves it for trial. See infra Part I (outlining the procedural
background of DNA indictments).
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skin, hair).3 Proponents of 'John Doe" indictments say that using a
DNA profile-rather than a name or physical description-to identify
the suspect in an arrest warrant or indictment is a legitimate way to
vindicate victims, prevent offenders from escaping justice, and prevent
future crimes. Critics, on the other hand, contend that issuing an ar-
rest warrant based on a DNA profile is a disingenuous device of the
prosecution that evades the statute of limitations and infringes on the
constitutional rights of the accused.5
Using DNA profiles to identify the accused in an indictment or ar-
rest warrant for the purpose of commencing a prosecution and effec-
tively taking a case outside of the statute of limitations raises certain
concerns about fairness to a defendant. However, this practice should
be able to'withstand judicial scrutiny. This Comment will argue that:
(1) DNA-based indictments meet the legal sufficiency requirements
for description; (2) DNA indictments are generally consistent with the
rationales behind statutes of limitations; (3) DNA indictments are sub-
ject to certain limitations; and (4) checks must be employed when us-
ing genetic profiles to commence a prosecution.
3 See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WHAT EVERY LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT DNA EVIDENCE, at http://www.ncjrs.org/niji/
DNAbro/what.html (Sept. 1999) ("Numerous cases have been solved by DNA analysis
of saliva on cigarette butts, postage stamps, and the area around the mouth opening
on ski masks. DNA analysis of a single hair... found deep in the victim's throat pro-
vided a critical piece of evidence used in a capital murder conviction.").
4 See, e.g., DNA Used to Indict Unidentified Rapist, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Mar. 16, 2000, at A7 ("A 'John Doe' indictment is legal if it contains a sufficient de-
scription of the suspect .... 'DNA certainly fits that bill."' (quoting H. Richard Uviller,
professor, Columbia University Law School)); Sean Gardiner, DNA Indictment: East Side
Rapist Is Identfied Only by His Genetic Code, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Mar. 16, 2000, at
A3 ("'Arming law enforcement with the power to bring an immediate indictment
would remove the current problem faced by prosecutors of concluding these difficult,
complex, criminal investigations before the state's five-year statute of limitations ex-
pires."' (quoting Sheldon Silver, New York Assembly Speaker, who proposed legislation
that would allow 'John Doe" indictments based solely on DNA samples)).
See, e.g., Gardiner, supra note 4 (" [T]he John Doe indictment is a 'very creative
way to circumvent the statute of limitations' but should not hold up under a court
challenge. 'The purpose of the statute of limitations is not for the district attorney, it's
for the accused... [to] have an opportunity to prepare a defense'...." (quoting Ger-
ald Lefcourt, a Manhattan-based defense attorney and former president of the Na-
tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers)); David Hafetz, DNA Is Used to Indict
Unknown Man in Rape, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Nov. 4, 2000, at Al (quoting William
Harrell, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, who called
DNA-based indictments a "fiction" that "hold[s] on to the statute of limitations by in-
venting the identity of someone" and a "cheap remedy for poor investigative efforts"
that contradict the intent behind statutory limitations).
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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
There are three ways the government formally can commence a
prosecution, whether for the purpose of tolling the statute of limita-
tions or otherwise. One way is to file a charge and then issue an arrest
warrant based on the underlying complaint.' Another way to com-
mence a prosecution is to present evidence to a grand jury.' If the
grand jury returns an indictment, the prosecution has commenced
formally s Both procedures have been used to commence prosecu-
tions against unidentified sexual assailants. 9 The third way to com-
mence a prosecution for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations
is to file an information against the accused.'
In the case of filing a charge and issuing an arrest warrant, con-
sider, for example, Paul Eugene Robinson, the first man in the coun-
try to be arrested in conjunction with a warrant identifying him only
by his DNA profile." Robinson has been charged with a rape that oc-
curred in 1994.12 Although his identity was unknown at the time,
6 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5552(e) (West 1981 & Supp. 2001) ("[A]
prosecution is commenced either when an indictment is found or an information...
is issued, or when a warrant, summons or citation is issued, if such warrant, summons
or citation is executed without unreasonable delay.").
7 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.60 (McKinney 1993) ("After hearing and
examining evidence ... a grand jury may indict a person for an offense .... "); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a grand jury as "[a] body of...
people who are chosen to sit... and who, in ex parte proceedings, decide whether to
issue indictments").
8 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5552(e).
9 New York has used a DNA indictment. DNA Sample Used to Indict "John Doe" in
N. Y. Rape Cases, supra note 1. Philadelphia and Sacramento have issued arrest warrants
based on genetic profiles. Prosecutors Issue DNA "John Doe" Warrant, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Dec. 13, 2001, at A14 (Philadelphia); Audrey Cooper, Man Charged in 1994
California Rape Case Based Solely on DNA, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Oct. 25, 2000, at 6A
(Sacramento). For a discussion of other cities that have issued DNA indictments, see
infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. 103 ("[An i]nformation is a formal written accusation of
an offense made by the attorney for the Commonwealth, upon which a defendant may
be tried, which replaces the indictment in all counties since the use of the indicting
grand jury has been abolished."); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 783
(defining an information as "[a] formal criminal charge made by a prosecutor without
a grand-jury indictment"). As its definition makes clear, Pennsylvania no longer actu-
ally uses indicting grand juries; rather, it uses grand juries only for investigative pur-
poses. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4548 (West 1981 & Supp. 2001) for a description
of an "investigating grand jury." Because filing an information has not, to my knowl-
edge, been used to commence a prosecution in conjunction with a DNA profile, I will
not discuss it in this Comment.
11 Cooper, supra note 9.
12 Robinson has not been convicted. Erin Hallissy, DNA-Based Warrant That Gave
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prosecutors in Sacramento filed charges for the assault in August of
2000, days before the six-year statute of limitations period expired.
1 3
Once the complaint was filed, a magistrate judge issued an arrest war-
rant.14 Robinson was arrested in September 2000 when state comput-
ers matched his DNA with the genetic code given in the 'John Doe"
warrant.'5 Robinson's DNA had been entered in the state's computer
databank16 after police arrested him for an unrelated criminal mat-
ter.1"
No Name Faces Appellate Test, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 6, 2001, at A3. In February of 2001, a
Sacramento Superior Court judge ruled that the warrant was constitutional. Id.
Robinson's attorney appealed, arguing that the arrest warrant did not adequately de-
scribe his client. Id. On April 6, 2001, the state appeals court in Sacramento sus-
pended his prosecution while deciding whether the state and federal constitutions bar
'John Doe" DNA warrants. Richard Willing, California Court Halts 'John Doe" DNA Case,
USA TODAY, Apr. 9, 2001, at 3A. On August 8, 2001, the Supreme Court of California
denied Robinson's application for stay and petition for review. Robinson v. Sacra-
mento County Superior Court, No. S097774, 2001 Cal. LEXIS 5386, at *1 (Cal. Aug. 8,
2001). In addition to Robinson's case, a circuit judge in Wisconsin has also upheld a
warrant that identified a suspect only by his DNA profile. Judge Upholds DNA-Based War-
rant, UPI, July 27, 2001, LEXIS. Judge Jeffrey A. Wagner opined: "'There is no de-
scription more reasonably certain than DNA' [and the law needs to] 'catch up with the
advances of this science."' Id. Judge Wagner added that there was no evidence that
police or prosecutors had deliberately delayed charging the suspect. Id.
:3 Cooper, supra note 9.
4 The actual complaint and warrant identifying the suspect would read something
like, 'John Doe, unknown male with matching deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile at
genetic locations .... " and proceed to list a series of letters and numbers listing the
measurements of DNA segments that collectively represent the genetic profile of the
accused rapist. See, e.g., Criminal Complaint filed with the Milwaukee County Circuit
Court, Criminal Division, at 1, 3, Wisconsin v.John Doe, Unknown Male with Matching
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Profile at Genetic Locations D1S7, D2S44, D4S139,
D5Sll0, D10S28 and D17S79 (Dec. 8, 1999) (on file with author) (stating that the
"unknown person involved in the sexual assault of [the victim] can be expected to
have a profile that matches the foreign DNA profile from the semen recovered from
the jeans of [the victim]").
15 Cooper, supra note 9.
6 All fifty states have legislation permitting criminal DNA databases. Aaron P.
Stevens, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of DNA Databases in America, 79 TEX. L. REV.
921, 922 (2001). For a list of the applicable statutes for each state, see id. at 922 n.12.
On the constitutionality of these statutes, Aaron Stevens has commented that "[t]he
U.S. Supreme Court has not yet ruled on any constitutional aspect of convict testing
for DNA databases and has denied certiorari in two cases," and that "no state DNA da-
tabase statutes have been held unconstitutional by any court." Id. at 941-42 (footnotes
omitted).
17 Cooper, supra note 9. Robinson's DNA was entered into the state database in
1998, when he was paroled after serving a five-year sentence for burglary. Erin Hallissy
& Charlie Goodyear, Databank Match Brings Arrest on DNA Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
25, 2000, at A3. Ironically, his DNA was entered mistakenly; only murderers, rapists,
violent assailants, and child molesters are subject to inclusion in the DNA database. Id.
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Other jurisdictions have proceeded by DNA indictments. In
Manhattan, a grand jury indicted the so-called "East Side rapist" based
on his genetic profile. 8 A Wisconsin grand jury returned an indict-
ment against an unknown suspect whose DNA was linked to three
rapes that occurred in Milwaukee in 1993.19 In New Mexico, a grand
jury returned a forty-four-count felony indictment against 'John Doe,"
an unidentified male "suspected of stalking, drugging and raping nine
Albuquerque women over an eight-year period."2 ° Despite the proce-
dural difference between DNA indictments and DNA arrest warrants,2 1
both practices implicate the same question: Does a genetic profile
meet the legal requirements for sufficiency of description of the ac-
cused?22  This question, along with the policy issues embedded
therein, is central to determining whether DNA indictments are con-
stitutional.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CONTENTS
OF AN INDICTMENT OR CHARGE
In order to be enforceable, an indictment or charge must meet
certain requirements. If a prosecutor wishes to commence a prosecu-
tion by filing a complaint, in order for the complaint to be valid, it
must be in writing, under oath, and state the essential facts about the
21offense charged. If the magistrate judge presented with the com-
However, California's law concerning the DNA databank specifies that arrests and con-
victions will not be invalidated on grounds that DNA was mistakenly entered in the da-
tabase. Id.
18 DNA Used to Indict Unidentfled Rapist, supra note 4.
19 Gardiner, supra note 4.
20 Jones, supra note 1.
21 A prosecutor may choose one over the other for various legal or tactical reasons.
For example, federal criminal procedure gives the defendant the right to be indicted
by a grand jury for certain offenses. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 7(a) ("An offense which may
be punished by death .... [and a]n offense which may be punished by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year ... shall be prosecuted by indictment."). One tactical
reason for using a grand jury is the increased investigative opportunity for the prosecu-
tor. See, e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976) ("[T]he law vests
the grand jury with substantial powers .... Indispensable to the exercise of its power is
the authority to compel the attendance and the testimony of witnesses, and to require
the production of evidence." (citations omitted)). I suspect that in the case of 'John
Doe" DNA indictments, the state prosecutor may choose to proceed by grand jury be-
cause it lends the population's stamp of approval, through the jurors' return of the
indictment, to a case that is on shaky grounds.
22 Therefore, I will use the two procedures interchangeably in the discussion be-
low unless otherwise noted.
23 See, e.g., FED. R. CIM. P. 3 ("The complaint is a written statement of the essen-
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plaint believes there is probable cause that the accused committed the
crime, a warrant is issued for the arrest of the accused.24
A. Adequate Description of the Accused
A warrant must "contain the name of the defendant, or if [his]
name is unknown, any name or description by which [he] can be identified
with reasonable certainty."" The requirements for an indictment are
similar. One state's formulation is that when a grand jury returns an
indictment against an unnamed defendant, the indictment must "con-
tain words of description which have particular reference to the per-
son whom the Commonwealth seeks to convict."
2 6
Although a warrant describing its subject only as 'John Doe" is not
constitutionally sufficient,27 as long as it provides an adequate descrip-
tion of the accused, the warrant will not be invalidated. 28 A physical
tial facts constituting the offense charged. It shall be made upon oath before a magis-
tratejudge.").
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) ("If it appears from the complaint, or from an af-
fidavit or affidavits filed with the complaint, that there is probable cause to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, a warrant for
the arrest of the defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute it.").
25 FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(c) (1) (emphasis added). "This Rule has been read as a gloss
on the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Doe, 703 F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir. 1983)
(construing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481 n.9 (1963)).
26 Connor v. Commonwealth, 296 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Mass. 1973). The name of the
accused is not essential to an indictment.
[An indictment is a written accusation] against a person, and not against a
name. A name is not of the substance of an indictment. And a person may be
well indicted, without the mention of any name, and designating him as a per-
son whose name is to the grand jurors unknown.
Lasure v. State, 19 Ohio St. 43, 50 (1869).
27 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481 n.9 (1963) ("The Fourth
Amendment... provides that 'no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ....
and particularly describing ... the person .. .to be seized."' (last three alterations in
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)); see also MASS. R. CRIM. P. 6(b)(1)
(Bender, LEXIS through Jan. 1, 2002) (forbidding the use of warrants where the de-
fendant's name is unknown without a "description by which he can be identified with
reasonable certainty"); United States v. Doe, 703 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding
a warrant describing its subject only as 'John Doe a/k/a Ed" insufficient on the
grounds that there are thousands of people who go by the name "Ed" in the area
where the warrant was executed).
28 Johnny L. Griffin, III, counsel for criminal defendant Paul Robinson, argued
that "the controlling cases regarding the use of John Doe warrants do not address the
issue of these warrants being used to toll, extend or circumvent the statute of limita-
tions." Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 9 n.4, People v.
Robinson, No. 00F6871 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000) (on file with author). This should not
mean they are wholly irrelevant, however. The controllingJohn Doe cases should still
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description may suffice. For example, in a Wisconsin case, a descrip-
tion in an indictment directed against 'John Doe" that included the
alias "Leo" and "enumerate[d] various other particulars concerning
the race, sex, age, weight, hair color, eye color, and peculiar facial
characteristics" of the defendant was found to be sufficient to identify
the defendant.29 In another case, the Third Circuit upheld a warrant
describing its subject as 'John Doe, a white male with black wavy hair
and stocky build observed using the telephone in [a particular apart-
ment] .
A genetic code describes a person with far greater precision than a
physical description or a name. While many people have the same
name or may be described, for example, as having black hair or being
five feet nine inches tall, "each person's DNA is different from every
other individual's except for identical twins."'', Therefore, a 'John
Doe" DNA warrant should provide a legally adequate description of
the accused. Although 'John Doe" warrants are disfavored by law en-
forcement, they are not novel. District attorneys have used 'John
Doe" warrants or indictments in conjunction with physical descrip-
32tions, fingerprints, and pictures of unknown suspects. Using genetic
codes in 'John Doe" indictments seems to be a logical extension of
these practices.
The use of DNA to indict suspects is similar to the use of finger-
prints. The National Institute ofJustice has written:
When using either DNA or a fingerprint to identify a suspect, the evi-
dence collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known"
print. If enough of the identifying features are the same, the DNA or
fingerprint is determined to be a match. If however, even one feature of
the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is determined not to have come
apply in determining whether the warrant is specific enough. If it is valid, the state
technically has commenced the prosecution and, hence, met the statute of limitations.
If an unreasonable amount of time elapses before the accused is actually brought to
trial, issues concerning the Speedy Trial provision of the Constitution may be raised.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial ...."). For example, if a fugitive, whose name is
known, is indicted but not brought to trial for years because he could not be located,
the appropriate challenge might be violation of the right to a speedy trial, not failure
to meet the statute of limitations.
29 United States v. Doe, 401 F. Supp. 63, 65 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
30 United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381, 389 (3d Cir. 1971).
31 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at http://www.ncjrs.org/nij/DNAbro/
what.html.
32 DNA Sample Used to Indict "John Doe" in N. Y Rape Cases, supra note 1.
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from that suspect."
33
In both cases, once a match is found and the suspect is identified by
name, he can be apprehended and put to trial.
B. The Policy Behind the Sufficiency Rule
The purpose of requiring an adequate description of the accused
is (1) to give notice to the accused of the charges against him and (2)
to ensure that the language used is sufficient to protect the defendant
34against double jeopardy. It is debatable whether the defendant is ac-
tually put on notice by an indictment identifying him solely by his ge-
netic code. "Unlike an alias, physical description, place of residence,
social security number, or other such means of identification, a per-
son does not usually know his or her DNA profile."35 A complaint
identifying the accused by his DNA may not inform him that he is be-
ing prosecuted unless he actually knows his genetic profile.
This criticism is difficult to refute. One response is that the pos-
sessor of the particular genetic code is on constructive notice. He, after
all, was the one who committed the crime. The state should not be
bothered by the fact that a rapist who has managed to conceal his
identity may not have actual notice that he is being prosecuted. The
troubling aspect of this response is that it assumes the guilt of some-
one based solely on the presence of his genetic material. Evidence of
a person's genetic material does not always indicate that a rape was
committed. There may have been consensual sex, in which case the
accused would have no reason to believe he was the subject of a felony
prosecution. There may have been no sexual contact at all. Especially
where the genetic material is something other than semen, it is less
certain that any sexual act occurred.
This problem, though, would arise in very limited circumstances.
33 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at http://www.ncjrs.org/nij/DNAbro/
intro.html.
34 See United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The Sixth
Amendment requires that an indictment ... fairly inform the defendant of the charges
filed against him ...." (citing United States v. Arlen, 947 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir.
1991)); United States v. De Stefano, 476 F.2d 324, 328 (7th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he impor-
tant function of [an] ... indictment is to apprise the defendant of the nature of the
offense ... and to make an adequate record so that the defendant can plead any con-
viction or acquittal resulting from the indictment as a bar to future prosecutions." (ci-
tation omitted)). The issue of double jeopardy is not relevant to this discussion and
therefore will not be considered.
35 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject MatterJurisdiction, supra note 28, at 9.
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First, there would have to be a woman who claims "rape" when there
36
was, in fact, no rape. Second, a DNA profile would only be used
where the woman did not know the name or physical description of
the person she was accusing. Further, the police would have to be
unable to identify the suspect through reasonable investigation within
the statutory limitation of five or six years, depending on the jurisdic-
tion. While possible, the chance of these circumstances simultane-
ously existing is slim enough to be outweighed by the benefits of al-
lowing DNA-based warrants or indictments in rape or sexual assault
cases.
Using a physical description or sketch to further describe the sub-
ject of an indictment may partially address the problem of notice. s As
noted above, a person generally does not know his genetic profile.6
However, a person may recognize his own physical description or
sketch and thereby be put on notice. A man who knows he is inno-
cent, for example, may prefer to contact authorities and settle the is-
sue rather than risk the prejudice of a delayed prosecution. A man
who knows he is guilty, while he is under no legal obligation to turn
himself in (and would probably be best off not to, lest he be viewed as
making a confession), at a bare minimum, has the option of obtaining
counsel to prepare a defense for any future prosecution.
Why does the issue of fair notice to the defendant take on greater
importance when a DNA warrant or indictment is used to meet the
statute of limitations? The answer lies in the rationales for having
statutes of limitations in the first place.
36 In other words, she would claim rape when the sex was consensual or did not
occur at all. Two possible scenarios are a cheating girlfriend or wife who claims rape
to conceal her infidelity or a young girl who does not want to admit to her parents that
she has had consensual intercourse. Although no exhaustive data exists on the per-
centage of false rape accusations, many claim that only about two percent of rape
claims are unfounded. See Edward Greer, The Truth Behind Legal Dominance Feminism's
"Two Percent False Rape Claim" Figure, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 947, 949 n.1 1 (citing many
authors who state a two percent false rape claim rate). Greer, however, argues that the
number is lacking empirical basis. See id. ("This empirical fact (of a two percent false
rape claim rate] ... is an ideological fabrication.").
37 This would eliminate the scenario of the woman who claims rape falsely in or-
der to "get back at" someone. Presumably, the woman in such a case would know the
identity of the accused.
38 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing the validity of 'John
Doe" warrants). 'John Doe" warrants that give a physical description of the accused
have been upheld. Arguably, a sketch is equivalent-it is a pictorial physical descrip-
tion-and could be upheld on the same grounds.
39 Supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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III. RATIONALES FOR THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Statutes of limitations are legislatively or judicially created laws
that limit the time during which a prosecution can be commenced.4 °
After this period of time has expired, the crime cannot be prosecuted.
41Generally, more serious crimes have a lengthier limitation period.
Some crimes, such as murder, may have no statute of limitations at
all.
42
Statutes of limitations acknowledge that with the passage of time
caused by delayed prosecution, evidence degrades, memories become
less clear, and a defense becomes more difficult to mount.4 The Due
Process Clause may also help to prevent pre-prosecution delay, but it
is difficult to raise a successful claim: the defense must show both that
the delay "caused substantial prejudice to [the] appellee's rights to a
fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical
40 See generally Jonathan W. Diehl, Note, Drafting a Fair DNA Exception to the Statute of
Limitations in Sexual Assault Cases, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 431, 43941 (1999) (arguing that
an exception to statutes of limitations based on DNA evidence will not unduly burden
defendants if the scope of the exception is limited and additional safeguards are im-
plemented); Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of
Limitation, 28 PAc. L.J. 453, 460-500 (1997) (discussing the rationales for statutes of
limitations including that they promote repose, minimize the deterioration of evi-
dence, place defendants and plaintiffs on equal footing, promote cultural values of
diligence, encourage the prompt enforcement of substantive law, avoid retrospective
application of contemporary standards, and reduce volume of litigation).
41 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5552 (West Supp. 2001) (providing that the
prosecution for an offense must commence within two years after it was committed,
unless the offense falls under the category of major offenses, in which case the appli-
cable statute of limitations is five years); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 799 (West 1985 &
Supp. 2002) (allowing prosecutions for offenses punishable by death, life imprison-
ment, or life without the possibility of parole to be commenced "at any time"); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAw § 30.10 2(a) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (allowing prosecutions for class
A felonies to be commenced at any time).
42 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-5 (West Supp. 2001) (placing no limitation
on beginning a prosecution for crimes of homicide, treason, arson, or forgery);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 (1985) ("A prosecution for murder may be commenced at
any time."). In certain cases, Florida, Mississippi, Nevada, and New Mexico impose no
statute of limitations for rape. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.15(1) (b) (West Supp. 2002)
("[P]rosecution for a first or second degree felony violation of s. 794.011 [sexual bat-
tery], if such crime is reported to a law enforcement agency within 72 hours after
commission of the crime, may be commenced at any time."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-1-5
(1999) (imposing no statute of limitations for murder or rape prosecutions); NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 171.083 (Michie Supp. 2001) ("No limitation for sexual assault if
written report filed with law enforcement officer during period of limitation ....");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-8G (Michie Supp. 2001) ("[F]or a capital felony or first degree
violent felony, no limitation period shall exist and prosecution for these crimes may
commence at any time after the occurrence of the crime.").
43 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971).
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advantage over the accused.",44 Because these requirements are too
stringent for most defendants to meet, the statute of limitations serves
a vital role in protecting against pre-indictment delay. In United States
v. MarionJustice White explained:
"[T]he applicable statute of limitations ... is... the primary guarantee
against bringing overly stale criminal charges." Such statutes represent
legislative assessments of relative interests of the State and the defendant
in administering and receiving justice; they "are made for the repose of
society and the protection of those who may [during the limitation] ...
have lost their means of defence." These statutes provide predictability
by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumptionS . 45
that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.
While statutes of limitations are necessary for ensuring the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial, DNA indictments do not contravene the pol-
icy behind them.
A. Preservation of Evidence
One rationale behind the statute of limitations is to protect
against the loss or degradation of physical evidence. 4" In rape cases,
however, where DNA evidence is available, the risk that important evi-
dence will be lost over time-and that the defense will suffer prejudice
as a result-is diminished. DNA evidence is less susceptible to losing
its probative value over time than other types of evidence. Once the
sample is tested and profiled, it can be matched against a sample
taken from a suspect at any time in the future, however distant. Be-
cause a person's genetic code (unlike a name or physical attribute) is
fixed,47 it retains its evidentiary value over time. Moreover, properly
preserved genetic material can be kept indefinitely, so that a defen-
481
dant can have the material tested independently for accuracy.
44 Id. at 324.
45 Id. at 322 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
46 Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 471-83.
47 See ACLU Massachusetts, DNA Testing ACLU Q&A, at http://www.aclu-
mass.org/privacy/dnaqna.html (last updated Aug. 13, 2001) ("DNA codes do not
change over a lifetime, and the same codes are present in every cell of an individual's
body.").
48 See DAVID H. KAYE & GEORGE F. SENSABAUGH, JR., REFERENCE GUIDE ON DNA
EVIDENCE 506, at http://air.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman09.pdf/$file/
sciman09.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2002) ("In dry biological samples, protected from
air, and not exposed to temperature extremes, DNA degrades very slowly. In fact, the
relative stability of DNA has made it possible to extract usable DNA from samples hun-
dreds to thousands of years old.").
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B. Loss of Witness Recollection
While DNA evidence stands the test of time, there still exists the
concern that the defense may lose other ephemeral evidence, such as
witness recollections that have faded with time.49 For example, a de-
fendant may be able to call witnesses to testify about the circumstances
surrounding the alleged assault if timely notified. Years later, the ac-
cused may not be able to locate such witnesses, the witnesses may not
remember, and the accused himself may not have a clear recollection
of events at issue.
One approach to this problem is to ask whether the defense has
suffered prejudice from this loss of evidence. Jonathan Diehl suggests
that when a defendant who asserts a credible defense of consent can
demonstrate a reasonable probability of prejudice (as opposed to the ac-
tual prejudice standard for a due process claim), he should be excluded
from any DNA exception to the statute of limitations.50 As Diehl notes
though, "[i]n most cases, a defendant is unlikely to show reasonable
probability of prejudice when identifying DNA is present. Unless
there is reason to believe that ... the sex was consensual, a positive
DNA identification is likely to overwhelm any evidence the defendant
could have presented within the statute of limitations."5 In other
words, once the issue of identity is eliminated (through a DNA
match), there must be serious doubt that the sex was forced in order
for ajury to acquit.
C. Need for Repose
Statutes of limitations "promote repose and decrease uncer-
tainty."2 An accused individual generally should not have to live in
perpetual uncertainty about whether the state will prosecute him.55
This rationale is sensible only when the individual's identity is known.
In such cases, the state should not be permitted to delay indefinitely
its choice to prosecute an identified suspect. The rationale for provid-
ing repose to a potential defendant is less compelling when the reason
49 See, e.g., Mo., Kan., & Tex. Ry. v. Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 672 (1913) ("The pol-
icy of statutes of limitation is ... that the parties shall not suffer ... from death or dis-
appearance of witnesses... or failure of memory.").
50 Diehl, supra note 40, at 441.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 435 (footnote omitted).
.53 See generally Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 460-71 (discussing promotion of
repose as a rationale for statutes of limitations).
'JOHN DOE" INDICTMENTS
for delay is that the suspect has concealed his identity from the victim
and from the state. "Arguably, those guilty of crimes do not deserve
the peace of mind that comes with the passage of the statutory 
limit."5 4
The need for repose is not limited to the accused. Society's ra-
tionales for punishment become less persuasive with the passage of
time. For example, an offender who has committed a crime in the
past, but who has not been arrested for other, more recent crimes,
may be reformed and no longer in need of specific deterrence. This,
however, assumes that the offender, because he has not been arrested
for more recent subsequent offenses, has not committed more crimes.
Even if the need for specific deterrence is reduced, i.e. where the of-
fender has reformed, general deterrence is still necessary. Other po-
tential offenders, realizing that certain crimes will be punished re-
gardless of how long the accused remains anonymous, may be
deterred from committing similar crimes.
Another reason for the statute of limitations is that society's need
for retribution diminishes with time.56 This argument is less cogent
when dealing with a crime as serious as rape. One can analogize to
homicide, where there is generally no statute of limitations.5 ' The
long-term effect on rape victims belies claims that the need for retri-
58
bution diminishes with time.
D. Ensuring Prompt Police and Prosecutorial Practices
Statutes of limitations encourage prosecutor and police prompt-
ness.5 9 Without a statute, the police may lack incentive to exercise due
diligence in investigating the case. They may forgo extensive investi-
54 Diehl, supra note 40, at 435 (footnote omitted). Diehl wisely notes, though, that
"not all of those who stand accused of a crime are guilty; statutes of limitations bring
repose to the innocent as well." Id. (footnote omitted). Safeguards can be put in place
to protect innocent people. Infra Part VI.
15 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 cmt. 1 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985) ("[I]f the actor long refrains from further criminal activity, the likelihood in-
creases that he has reformed, diminishing the necessity for imposition of the criminal
sanction.").
56 Diehl, supra note 40, at 435.
57 See supra note 42 (discussing relevant statutes of limitations for homicide).
58 See generally Carol C. Nadelson et al., A Follow-Up Study of Rape Victims, 139 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1266 (1982) (suggesting that rape victims were still suffering the effects of
the rape up to two and a half years after the rape).
59 See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) ("Such a time limit may
also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to in-
vestigate suspected criminal activity.").
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gation and simply file charges based on the DNA evidence they al-
ready possess. Procedural safeguards can prevent such abuse. One
possibility is to have magistrate judges require the police to show that
they have exercised a reasonable degree of effort to identify the sus-
pect before issuing a 'John Doe" arrest warrant. In cases where the
police and prosecution have exercised due diligence, it is not in the
interest of justice to let the case evaporate when there exists highly
probative evidence to use at trial if the suspect is later identified.
IV. RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Many believe that the probative value of DNA evidence is suffi-
ciently high to overcome the risk of prejudice to the defense. Several
recent proposals for, and adoption of, legislation that eliminates or
extends the applicable statute of limitations in rape cases in which
there is DNA evidence demonstrate this belief.6 ° For example, Cali-
fornia has recently amended its statute of limitations for sexual assault
cases so that the relevant limitation is either ten years from the com-
mission of the crime or one year after the suspect is conclusively iden-
tified by DNA testing. 1 In the case of the latter, the limitation period
is effectively eliminated, provided that the biological material to be
used as evidence is analyzed within two years of the commission of the
offense. This extension of the statute to within one year after the sus-
pect is conclusively identified by DNA demonstrates the confidence
See Amy Dunn, Note, Criminal Law-Statutes of Limitation on Sexual Assault Crimes:
Has the Availability of DNA Evidence Rendered Them Obsolete, 23 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.
REV. 839, 858 & nn.154-57 (2001) (discussing proposals to amend limitations in Penn-
sylvania, Michigan, and New York).
61 The California Penal Code states:
Notwithstanding the limitation of time described in Section 800, the limita-
tions period for commencing prosecution for a felony offense described in
subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 290, where
the limitations period set forth in Section 800 has not expired as ofJanuary 1,
2001, or the offense is committed on or afterJanuary 1, 2001, shall be 10 years
from the commission of the offense, or one year from the date on which the identity of the
suspect is conclusively established by DNA testing, whichever is later, provided, how-
ever, that the one-year period from the establishment of the identity of the
suspect shall only apply when either of the following conditions is met:
(A) For an offense committed prior to January 1, 2001, biological evidence
collected in connection with the offense is analyzed for DNA type no later
than January 1, 2004.
(B) For an offense committed on or after January 1, 2001, biological evi-
dence collected in connection with the offense is analyzed for DNA type no
later than two years from the date of the offense.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 803(i) (1) (West Supp. 2002) (emphasis added).
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that the California legislature has in the probative value of DNA.
Ironically, such legislation can be used to argue against the use of
DNA warrants or indictments in order to meet the statute of limita-
tions. Notably, the legislators did not opt to legitimize the use of
'John Doe" warrants or indictments in the legislation. They only
opted to extend the statute of limitations under certain circumstances.
This is an inclusio unius, exclusio alterius type of argument. If legislators
had desired to legitimize such practices, they could have done so. On
the other hand, legislators may not have included such provisions be-
cause they were not aware of the possibility or because they thought
that the extension of the statute of limitations in such cases would ob-
viate the problem. If prosecutors are given (as the new statute pro-
vides for) an unspecified period to find a DNA match to make a con-
clusive identification, and then one year henceforth to commence
their prosecution, there would seem to be no need for using 'John
Doe" DNA indictments or warrants in the first place.
While the legislators intended to ensure that prosecutions be
timely commenced once the identity of the suspect has been established by a
DNA match,6 3 it is difficult to see how the effect would be different
whether one proceeded by use of a DNA indictment or under an
amended statute such as California's. That is, if one proceeds using a
DNA warrant, the prosecution has technically commenced and thus
met the statute of limitations. Once the identity of the suspect is dis-
covered, the prosecutor is expected to continue the prosecution and
bring the defendant to trial in a timely manner. If this does not hap-
pen, the defendant has a strong claim that his constitutional right to a
speedy trial has been violated.64
The Sixth Amendment guarantee to a speedy trial, however, has
not been strictly defined. In Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court held
that the right to a speedy trial could be decided only on a case-by-case
basis.65 The Court articulated a balancing test that would take into ac-
62 Other states have drafted, and perhaps already have adopted, similar legislation.
See, e.g., Diehi, supra note 40, at 436 ("[T]he Illinois Senate ... voted to eliminate stat-
utes of limitations whenever identifying DNA is present. Apparently, it believed DNA
evidence overcomes the risk that the passage of time will result in the loss of important
evidence.").
63 See supra note 61 (quoting the legislation, which provides that a prosecution
may commence within one year after the suspect is conclusively identified by DNA test-
ing).
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right to a speedy.., trial....").
65 See 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) ("[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessi-
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count the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether the
defendant asserted his Sixth Amendment right, and the prejudice to
the defendant.66 Elsewhere, the right to a speedy trial has been con-
strued in terms of whether the delay was necessary or reasonable. For
example, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) provides that "if
there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court
may dismiss the indictment, information, or complaint.'
67
A court would likely find that delay caused by the inability to iden-
tify and apprehend the suspect is reasonable so long as the police and
prosecutor exercised due diligence in their investigations. Once the
suspect has been identified, the court can exercise its discretion as to
whether the state has unreasonably delayed bringing the suspect to
trial. Therefore, the use of a DNA warrant or indictment to meet the
statute of limitations does not place an accused in perpetual jeopardy
of prosecution any more than does legislation such as California's
amendment to section 803 of its penal code.6s
V. LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF A GENETIC CODE TO COMMENCE THE
PROSECUTION FOR PURPOSES OF MEETING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Although prosecutors have used DNA indictments to meet the
statute of limitations thus far only in sexual assault cases, there is no
reason why these indictments could not be used for other crimes.
DNA profiling lends itself most obviously to sex crimes, but why not
use a hair left behind at the scene of a robbery, a fingernail scraping
from the victim of a simple assault,6 9 or even a fingerprint left behind
during a burglary? The gravity of the crime should be weighed care-
fully before taking such a measure.
A. Variation in Probative Value of Evidence
As the probative value of the material diminishes, absent other
corroborating evidence, it becomes less desirable to use genetic mate-
tates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case . ).
66 Id. at 530.
67 FED. R. CiuM. P. 48(b) (emphasis added).
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 803(i) (1) (West Supp. 2002) ("[T he limitations period
for commencing prosecution... shall be 10 years from the commission of the offense,
or one year from the date on which the identity of the suspect is conclusively estab-
lished by DNA testing, whichever is later....").
69 During a struggle, a victim may scratch her attacker and trap bits of blood or
skin under her fingernails.
1095"JOHN DOE" INDICTMENTS
rial alone to commence a prosecution against someone. For example,
hair found at the scene of a crime alone may suggest little beyond the
fact that the person to whom the hair belongs was at one time present
at the site. In such a case, it may be inappropriate to commence a
prosecution. On the other hand, seminal fluid collected during a
rape examination is far more suggestive that a rape occurred. At a
minimum, it provides evidence that there was sexual contact.
B. Special Procedures to Protect Against Error
Special care must be taken to minimize the risk of error when us-
ing DNA. There are two types of errors that occur in handling DNA.
First, there is a risk of error in handling the evidence before it reaches
the laboratory. ° Mishandling, resulting in contamination and misla-
beling, may lead to a false positive match." This is the most difficult
type of error to correct after the passage of time, as witnesses are less
likely to remember the circumstances of the collection and transpor-
tation of the sample. The risk of mishandling, though, is always a pos-
sibility when there is forensic evidence involved. Police and techni-
cians who handle samples must adhere to strict procedural guidelines
and a system of documenting the chain of custody should be in place.
Error may also occur in the actual analysis of the material in the
laboratory. 2 Ensuring that the defendant is given an opportunity to
retest the evidence at an independent laboratory, should he wish to
challenge the validity of the match, can eliminate the risk of this type
of error. This requires both that a portion of the evidence is pre-
served for future testing 1 and that careful procedures are observed to
prevent degradation of the evidence.
4 One commentator has sug-
70 See COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC Sc.: AN UPDATE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EvIDENCE 80-82 (1996) (discussing the mishandling of
evidence and suggesting safeguards against such mishandling).
71 On the other hand, mishandling may lead to a false exclusion. One way this
can occur is when foreign biological material contaminates the sample. Testing may
then reflect the code of the foreign DNA, which will likely not match the suspect's-
and therefore exclude him as a suspect.
72 DNA Evidence, When Properly Collected and Analyzed, Should Not Be Called into Ques-
tion, The National Academies News, at http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/
isbn/0309053951?OpenDocument (May 2, 1996) ("Because no amount of effort can
completely eliminate the risk of laboratory error, the best protection an innocent sus-
pect has is the opportunity for an independent retest .... ).
73 Id. ("[Florensic samples should be divided into two or more parts as soon as
possible after collection and the unused parts should be retained to permit additional
tests.").
74 Kathryn M. Turman, Understanding DNA Evidence: A Guide for Victim Service Pro-
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gested, in the context of creating a DNA exception to the statute of
limitations for rape cases, that the statute of limitations should be re-
moved only if the specimen has been split and preserved for• 75
retesting.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
There are several possible ways to deal with the issue of the statute
of limitations for sexual assault cases. One possibility is to eliminate
the statute of limitations altogether in rape cases. 6 This seems the
least desirable solution; people could make complaints of rape at any
time in the future regardless of whether there is DNA evidence. Al-
though prosecutorial discretion would filter out the most insubstantial
claims, the absence of a statute of limitations gives the highest prob-
ability that the defense of those innocently accused will be prejudiced.
Another possibility is to amend statutes of limitations to provide
77exceptions for cases in which there is DNA evidence. Such excep-
tions should mandate that the DNA be analyzed within a specified pe-
riod of time after the crime is committed. A possible drawback to this
approach is that police may lack motivation, once the DNA has been
analyzed, to pursue their investigations actively. This would be espe-
cially true in difficult cases. Police may cease investigations and wait
passively until a "cold hit"78 is made with the computer database. Fur-
thermore, such exceptions should mandate that the prosecution
commence within a reasonable time after the identity of the suspect is
discovered. Once the suspect has been identified, there is no reason
to delay the prosecution any further.
The creation of DNA exceptions to the statute of limitations in
viders, OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME BULL. (U.S. Dep't ofJustice), Apr. 2001, at 3 ("Bio-
logical evidence should always be thoroughly airdried, packaged in paper, and prop-
erly labeled, ensuring that the chain of custody ... is maintained."), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/dna_4_2001/NCJ1 85690.pdf.
75 Diehl, supra note 40, at 440 ("The risk of prejudice could be further reduced by
limiting the statute to cases in which part of the evidence is preserved for future test-
ing .... If [police or laboratories] do not [preserve a portion of the specimen], they
risk the case being dismissed due to the statute of limitations.").
76 See supra note 42 (discussing how this approach has been taken in other states).
77 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (noting that California has taken a
similar approach).
78 A "cold hit" is "an association between an offender or a crime scene [that] is
made absent an investigative lead." Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
U.S. Department of Justice, First "Cold" Hit Recorded in National DNA Index System!
(July 21, 1999), at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel99/coldhit.htm. This occurs
when a sample is entered blindly against the entire database and a match is found. Id.
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rape cases is probably the most desirable. solution to the issue at hand.
These exceptions represent legislative judgments that: (1) the crime
of rape is grave enough to merit an extension of the statute; and (2)
the probative value of DNA is high enough to counterbalance the
competing concerns that the defense will be prejudiced. Additionally,
such legislation makes clear that the exception is limited to sexual as-
sault cases. Unfortunately, until state legislatures actually enact these
exceptions, thousands of unsolved sexual assault cases continue to be
lost to the statute of limitations.
Until states adopt such legislation, using DNA indictments or ar-
rest warrants in order to commence a prosecution may be a valid way
to preserve unsolved rape cases. In a technical sense, DNA indict-
ments do meet the legal requirements for commencing a prosecution.
In particular, the requirements for sufficiency of description theoreti-
cally can be met, for a person's genetic code is perhaps the most par-
ticular description of that person that exists. It is far more particular
than a name or even a physical description. While several people can
have the same name, only identical twins share the same genetic pro-
file. 9 If there are physical descriptions of the suspect available, in-
cluding police sketches, these should be included with the warrant or
indictment in order to describe its subject more fully.
In order to prevent abuse, however, the use of DNA indictments
or warrants should be conditioned on certain provisions. First, as
Diehl suggests, the DNA sample should be split and preserved so that
the defendant can have it retested independently.80 Strict guidelines
should be set to ensure the proper handling and documentation of
DNA specimens.
Second, a DNA indictment or warrant should be resorted to only
after some prescribed period of time. There should also be some
showing that the police have exercised due diligence in their investi-
gation and have exhausted their resources. DNA warrants should be
used only as a last resort.
Third, DNA indictments should be used only where the DNA
specimen is so probative that there is a reasonable certainty that the
sexual contact occurred. One way to ascertain this would be to have a
judicial hearing to determine that some level of suspicion beyond
79 See COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 3 (1992) ("Except for identical twins, the DNA of a
person is for practical purposes unique.").
80 Diehl, supra note 40, at 440.
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"probable cause" exists." For example, semen or a pubic hair col-
lected during a rape examination of the complainant may suffice. On
the other hand, something less suggestive such as blood or hair from
the scalp found at the crime site may not suffice.
Finally, DNA indictments should not be used to meet the statute
of limitations in cases of misdemeanors or minor offenses. There
should be some legislative guidance as to what crimes are not serious
enough to outweigh the prejudice suffered by the defense. Because of
the seriousness of sex crimes and the probative value of DNA, prose-
cutors should be able to use DNA specimens to commence rape
prosecutions that threaten to be lost to the statute of limitations.
Hopefully legislators will take notice.
81
David Rudovsky has called this "super-probable cause." Interview with David
Rudovsky, Senior Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School, in Philadelphia, Pa.
(Nov. 15, 2000).
